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This study aims to investigate two important issues: whether or not public infrastructure contributes to
production in the private sector, and whether or not political economy factors such as political situations,
lobbying  factors,  and  the  availability  of  national  grants  for  investment  affect  the  allocation  of  public
infrastructure  investment.    We  estimate  simultaneous  equations  by  using  a  panel  data  set  of  46
prefectures in Japan for 5 time periods from 1975 to 1990. From the empirical results, we conclude the
following:  (1)  public  capital  contributes  to  productivity,  (2)  the  investment  behavior  of  the  national
government is efficiency-oriented for private productivity but equity-oriented for the capital stock level,
(3) the complementarity of public capital investment between the national and the prefectural government
could hold, (4) there is no clear political factor in the national government’s public investment function,
and  (5)  the  availability  of  national  government  grants  for  the  construction  of  infrastructure  boosts
investment among prefectural governments.  
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Productivity Effects and Determinants of the Allocation of Public Infrastructure
Fumitoshi Mizutani and Tomoyasu Tanaka
1. Introduction
Inefficient use of public money is a policy issue of concern in Japan.    Some contend
that spending towards the formation of public capital does not promote economic growth, one
reason being that such investment is concentrated in underdeveloped regions which have a low
impact on the growth of economic activity.      Investment in underdeveloped regions might be
the result of political misallocation or simply the fact that public capital no longer contributes to
private productivity.    Our  study addresses these  two  important issues: whether or  not public
infrastructure  contributes  to  production  in  the  private  sector,  and  whether  or  not  political
economy factors  such  as  political  situations, lobbying factors  and  the availability  of  national
grants for investment affect the allocation of public infrastructure investment.    If the political
economy factors indeed affect the allocation of public capital investment, what factors are the
most deterministic?  
There are  three distinguishing  characteristics  of  our study.    First,  we  will  analyze
public capital’s effect on private productivity, considering the regional allocation of the national
government’s  public  capital investment.    Although  there  have  been many  studies  evaluating
public  capital’s  private  productivity,  there  has  not  been  much  research  considering  public
investment while also estimating public capital’s productivity effects.    Studies by Duffy-Deno
and  Eberts  (1991)  and  Kemmerling  and  Stephen  (2002)  analyze  the  determinants  of  public
investments as  well as the private production process by using simultaneous equations.    Our
study  may  be  characterized  secondly  by  our  consideration  of  both  the  national  and  the
prefectural  governments’  public  investment.    Although  our  approach  is  similar  to  that  of
Kemmerling and Stephen (2002), they do not include both kinds of  government.    Third, we
consider  several  factors  for  the  determinants  of  public  capital  investment:  efficiency/equity
reason  for private productivity and capital stock level, lobbying factors, political factors, and
fiscal  conditions.    Several  previous  studies  investigate  the  determinants  of  public  capital
investment  and/or  the  formation  of  public  capital.    For  example,  Crain  and  Oakley(1995)
investigate  political  factors.    Kemmerling  and  Stephen  (2002)  consider  lobbying  factors  as
well as political factors.    Kamada, Okuno and Futagami (1998) try to investigate how socio-
economic conditions such as income growth rate per capita and population growth rate affect3
the regional allocation of public capital investment.    We hope that our approach, with its three
characteristics, answers some of the main questions.
The  structure  of  this  paper  consists  of  four  parts  after  the  introduction.    In  the
second section, we will describe previous published studies related to this topic.    In this section
we  will  explain  the  empirical  evidence  on  private  productivity  related  to  public  capital,  the
simultaneous  approach  of  considering  both  private  production  and  public  capital  investment,
and determinants for public capital investments.    In the third section, the whole structure of the
model will be explained.    For methodology, as  we take a simultaneous approach to examine
these issues, we will explain the structure of four equations: private production, public capital
formation,  the  national  government’s  public  capital  investment  and  the  prefectural
government’s  public  capital  investment  functions.    Empirical  analysis  will  be  done  in  the
fourth section, where we will, first, describe the empirical models and hypotheses to test and,
second, explain the data  set for public  infrastructure  and related variables.    Public capital in
this  study  is  limited  to  public  infrastructure  such  as  roads,  ports,  airports,  banks  and  dams.
Railroads and electric power plants are excluded because these were built by the private sector
in Japan.    In  this study, we plan  to use a panel data set covering 46 prefectures and 5 time
periods for every 5 years from 1975 to 1995 in Japan, making the total sample size in this study
230.    Last,  we  will  estimate  simultaneous  equations  regarding  regional  production  function,
public  capital  formation  function,  and both  governments’  infrastructure  investment  functions.
By using  these  estimated  functions,  we  evaluate whether or  not public  capital  contributes to
production  and  what  kind  of  political  factors  affect  the  allocation  of  public  infrastructure
investment.    In the conclusion, we will summarize the major points.
2. Previous Studies on Productivity Effects and Allocation of Public Capital
There have been many studies on whether or not public capital contributes to production
in  the  private  sector.    In  this  section,  we  will  summarize  previous  studies  which  focus  on
public  capital’s  productivity  while  considering  the  allocation  of  public  capital  (as  for  an
overview on public capital, see Gramlich (1994)).    First, using time-series data for the whole
country,  it  is  commonly  shown  that  public  capital  contributes  to  private  production.    For
example, Ratner (1983), Aschauer(1989) and Vijverberg et al. (1997) for the U.S. and Iwamoto
(1990) for Japan show the positive contribution of public capital.    However, if the regions and
kinds of public capital are divided into smaller categories, then the estimation results of public
capital  on  productivity  vary  among  studies.    For  example,  Munnell  (1990)  and  Garcia-Mila4
and McGuire (1992), by analyzing U.S. data, find that some components of public capital such
as  Highway,  Water  Supply  and  Disposal,  and  Education  contribute  positively  to  private
production.    However, Evans and Karras (1994) show a quite different result: while the public
capital  of  education  is  productive,  there  is  no  evidence  that  other  government  stock  is
productive.    In Japan, empirical results are not consistent.    Mitsui et al. (1995) show that core
infrastructure of public capital makes a positive contribution but that there is no clear evidence
that non-core infrastructure does so.    Ida and Yoshida (1999) show that public capital such as
industry, living and environment are positive but that others such as education and land security
make a negative contribution.
There are several studies which consider public capital investment and its allocation
among  regions.    For  example,  Duffy-Deno  and  Eberts  (1991)  consider  the  linkage  between
public  investment  and  personal  income,  arguing  that  public  investment  influences  personal
income through the regional production process, while maintaining that the determination of the
level of public infrastructure is a consumption good in the median household’s utility function.
Therefore, Duffy-Deno and Eberts believe that public investment and personal income should
be estimated simultaneously.    They estimate these two simultaneous equations by using a data
set of 28 SMSAs in the U.S. from 1980 to 1984.    Their results show that public investment and
public capital stock have a positive effect on personal income and that personal income has a
positive effect on public investment.  
Kemmeling  and  Stephan  (2002)  also  consider  both  regional  production  and  public
investment.    Their study is characterized by the fact that the simultaneous equations consist of
the  regional  production  function,  the  public  investment  function  and  the  grant  allocation
function.    Kemmeling  and  Stephan  consider  the  political  factors  which  affect  public
investment and grant allocation.    They estimate these three equations simultaneously by using
a data set of 87 German cities for 1980,  1986 and 1988.    The results they obtained are the
following.    First,  local  public  capital  contributes  positively  to  private  production.    Second,
political affiliation is decisive in explaining the distribution of investment grants across cities.
Third,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  complementary  relationship  between  matching  investment
grants and infrastructure spending.  
Although Kemmeling and Stephan’s (2002) is the most recent study of how political
factors affect public investment, Crain and Oakley (1995) and Kamada, Okuno and Futagami
(1998) have also investigated several factors affecting public investment.    By using data from
U.S. states from 1978 to 1988, Crain and Oakley (1995) investigate how political institutions5
and processes affect public capital and public investment.    They find that institutions such as
term limits, citizen initiative, and budgeting procedures were significant determinants of state
public capital stocks and public investment.  
Kamada,  Okuno  and  Futagami  (1998)  investigate  the  factors  underlying  public
decisions on regional allocation of public investments.      They take for observation and analyze
ten regions of Japan for the time periods from 1955 to 1986, using the following as explanatory
variables:  population  growth  rate,  growth  rate  of  per  capita  income,  and  regional  income
inequality  index.    They  find  that  regional  income  inequality  is  an  important  factor  in
determining public investment.
3. Whole Structure of Models
In  this  study,  our  models  consist  of  four  simultaneous  equations:  (i)  production
function,  (ii)  public  capital  formation  function,  (iii)  national  government’s  public  capital
investment function, (iv) prefectural government’s public investment function.
(1) Production Function
The production function defined here is specified as a function of private capital (Kit),
labor input (Lit) and public capital stock (Git) in prefecture i in year t.    In this study, we specify
the dependent variable as a productivity measure, which is defined by dividing output (Yit) by
labor input (Lit).    Therefore, the production function is described as follows:
Yit/Lit = f(Kit/Lit, Git, t). (1)
(2) Public Capital Formation Function
The  public  capital  formation  function  expresses  how  the  public  capital  stock  is
formatted.    This function is specified as a function of the previous year’s capital stock level
(Gi,t-1),  the  national  government’s  public  capital  investment  (Ig
C
it)  and  the  prefectural
government’s public capital investment (Ig
P
it).    Therefore, the public capital formation function
is expressed as follows:





(3) The National Government’s Public Capital Investment Function
The national government’s public capital investment function is explained by several
factors.    The first factor is the productive efficiency/equity reason for public capital investment.6
That is, the national government invests public capital in the prefecture which has regions more
productive  in  private  economic  activity.    The  national  government  tries  to  promote  more
economic activity by investing more public capital.    Thus, if a prefecture has higher private
productivity (Yit/Lit), the prefecture tends to have more public capital investment.    Therefore, if
the coefficients  of  these  variables  have a  positive  sign,  then  the national government invests
more based on the productivity efficiency criteria.    On the other hand, if the government cares
greatly about the equity reason in this measure, the sign of the coefficient could be negative.
The second factor is the capital stock efficiency/equity reason.    The government’s
investment behavior is also affected by the stock level  of public capital(Gi,t-1/POP,t-1).    If the
government cares greatly about efficiency in this measure, then a prefecture  which has more
stock  of  public  capital  receives  more  investment.      On  the  other  hand,  if  the  national
government  invests  more  public  capital  in  order  to  reduce  regional  inequalities,  then  the
prefectures with less public  capital would receive more  public  investment.    In  this case, the
relationship between the national government’s investment and the stock of public capital could
be negative.  
The third factor is intergovernmental relationships.    As each prefectural government
also  invests  public  capital  in  itself,  the  prefectural  government’s  investment  behavior  could
affect  the  national  government’s  behavior.    Although  strictly  speaking,  it  is  an  empirical
question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  national  government’s  investment  is  complementary,
substitutive or neutral in relation to the prefectural government’s investment, we assume that the
coefficient of this variable might be positive.    The main reason is that in many cases public
investment is done cooperatively by the national government and the prefectural government.
Therefore, we include the prefectural government’s investment (Ig
P
it).  
The  fourth  factor  is  lobbying  from  industries  related  to  public  capital  investment.
Because more investment in public capital increases total revenues and job opportunities for the
industries related to public  capital, the industries have incentives  to promote lobbying.    The
percentage of the primary industry in number of employees (RAGit) and the percentage of the
construction industry in number of employees (RCNit) can be considered as related to this factor.  
Finally, there is the political factor, in which politicians could use to their advantage
the degree of public capital investment.    Clearly, politics is one important factor in attracting
public  investment,  with  one  well-known  job  of  politicians  being  to  promote  big  national
infrastructure  construction  projects  in  their  home  districts.    Historically,  regions  with
influential politicians tend to have more big projects.    Among several other factors related to7
politics,  one  interesting  question  is  whether  or  not  political  stability  tends  to  have  positive
relationship with public capital investment.    In order to test this factor, we include the ratio of
majority vote to minority vote in the House of Representatives(RLSit).  




it =hN(Gi,t-1/POP,t-1 , Yit/Lit , Ig
P
it , RAGit , RCNit, RLSit,) (3)
(4) The Prefectural Government’s Public Investment Function
The  prefectural  government’s  public  capital  investment  function  is  generally
explained by the same kinds of factors as the national government’s capital investment function.
The first and the second factor are the efficiency/equity reason in both private productivity and
the capital stock level for public capital investment.    Private productivity (Yit/Lit) and the stock
of public capital per capita (Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1) can be explained as related to these factors.    If the
coefficients  of  these  variables  have  a  positive  sign,  then  the  prefectural  government  invests
more based on the efficiency reason.    On the other hand, if these have a negative sign, then the
prefectural government invests more based on the equity reason.
The third factor is the intergovernmental  relationship.    To test whether or not the
prefectural government’s investment has a complementary, substitutive or neutral relation to the
national government’s investment, we include the national government’s investment (Ig
C
it).  
The fourth factor is lobbying from industries related to public capital formation.    In
this function, the percentage of the primary industry in number of employees (RAGitt) and the
percentage of the construction industry in number of employees (RCNitt) are included as in the
National Government’s investment function.  
The fifth factor is political.    In order to test this factor, we include the percentage of
votes for the Liberal Democratic Party in prefectural congress (PLDit).  
The  last  is  the  fiscal  factor  of  the  prefectural  government.    Most  prefectural
governments  in  Japan  have  been  facing  financial  difficulties.    In  many  cases,  prefectural
expenditures exceed tax revenues.    We seek to test how  the prefectural government’s public
capital  investment  would  be  affected  by  the  fiscal  situation.    Therefore,  prefectural
government’s prefectural budget constraints affect public  capital investment.    With regard to
this  factor,  national  government  grants  for  the  construction  of  infrastructure  (NTGit)  and
Revenues-expenditures  ratio  in  prefectural  budget  (BALit-1)  are  included.    Therefore,  the
prefectural government’s public capital investment function is expressed as follows.8
Ig
P
it = hN(Gi,t-1/POP,t-1, Yitt/Lit , Ig
C
it , RAGit , RCNit, PLDit, NTGit , BALit-1)    (4)
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Empirical Models
The  empirical  models  for  these  functions  are  generally  specified  as  log-log  form.
Although the original form of the production function is specified as the Cobb-Douglas form,
production function in this study is expressed as private productivity by dividing by labor (Lit).
These  functions  are  specified  as  equation  (5)  to  (8).    We  estimate  these  four  equations
simultaneously.
Production Function:
ln(Yit/Lit) =at + aK ln(Kit/Lit) + aG lnGi,t (5)




Public Capital Formation Function:
lnGit = bt + b1 lnGi,t-1 + b2 lnIg
C
it + b3 lnIg
P
it, (6)
where      Ig
C
it: National government’s public capital investment for each prefecture,
                                Ig
P
it:  Prefectural  government’s  public  capital  investment  for  each
prefecture.
National Government’s Public Capital Investment Function:
lnIg
C
it = gt + g1 ln(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1)+ g2 ln(Yit/Lit)+ g3 lnIg
P
it + g4 lnRAGit +
  g5 lnRCNit+ g6 lnRLSit, (7)
                where Gi,t-1/POP,t-1: Public capital stock per population in the previous year,
RAGit: Percentage of employees in the first industry,
RCNit: Parcentage of employees in the construction industry,
RLSit:  Ratio  of  majority  vote  to  minority  vote  in  the  House  of
Representatives.
Prefectural Government’s Public Capital Investment Function:
lnIg
P
it = di + d1 ln(Gi,t-1/Li,t-1) + d2 ln(Yit/Lit)+ d3 lnIg
C
it + d4 lnRAGit +9
  d5 lnRCNit+ d6 lnPLDit + d7 lnNTGit + d8 lnBALit, (8)
                  where    PLDit: Percentage of vote for the Liberal Democratic Party in the prefectural
congress,
                                NTGit: National government grants for the construction of infrastructure,
                                BALit-1: Stand-alone revenues-expenditures ratio of prefectural budget.
Endogenous  variables  are  private  sector’s  productivity(Yit/Lit),  stock  of  public
capital(Git),  national  government’s  public  capital  investment  for  each  prefecture(Ig
C
it),
prefectural  government’s  public  capital  investment  for  each  prefecture(Ig
P
it)  and  nine  other
variables which are exogenous. Parameters at , bt , gt , dt , t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 refer to fixed effects
for time periods.      The estimation method is the three stage least square (3SLS) method.    The
expected sign for these variables is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Expected Sign of Coefficients for Regression Analysis
Production ln(Kit/Lit) lnGi,t
function + +





formation function + + +
Public capital ln(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1) ln(Yitt/Lit) LnIg
P
it lnRAGit lnRCNit lnRLSit
investment (national) ? ? ? + + ?
Public capital ln(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1) ln(Yitt/Lit) lnIg
C
it lnRAGit lnRCNit lnPLDit lnNTGit lnBALi,t-1
investment (prefecture) ? ? ? + + ? + +
(Note): The notation “?” refers to the empirical questions in the regressions.
4.2 Hypothesis
In this study, we will investigate whether or not the following eight hypotheses are
held, the details of which will be explained.
Hypothesis 1: Public capital contributes to productivity.
As  we  mentioned  earlier,  previous  studies do  not  have  consistent results.    In  this
study, we will investigate why the estimation results of public capital on productivity are quite
different  among  previous  studies.    For  example,  some  studies  in  the  U.S.,  such  as  Munell10
(1990) , Merriman (1990) and Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992), find that some components of
public capital such as Highway, Water Supply and Disposal, and Education contribute positively
to private production.    On the  other  hand, Evans and Karras (1994)  show a different result:
public capital, except for education, does not aid private production.    Holtz-Eakin (1994) also
shows that public capital does not contribute private production.    In Japan, Mitsui et al. (1995)
show  that  core  infrastructure  of  public  capital  makes  a  positive  contribution  but  non-core
infrastructure  is not significant.    Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) and Ida  and Yoshida  (1999)
show that public capital such as industry, living and environment are positive but public capital
such as education and land security have negative effects.    In summary, we assume that public
capital contributes to private productivity.    Therefore, aG > 0 (i.e.for lnGi,t ) holds.
Hypothesis  2:  The  government  invests  more  public  capital  based  on  efficiency  in  private
productivity.
As  we  explained  before,  public  capital  investment  is  made  according  to  the
productive efficiency/equity reason in private production.    If the government tries to promote
more  economic  activity,  then  the  government  invests  more  public  capital.    In  this  case,  the
prefecture with higher productivity tends to have more public capital investment.    Therefore, if
the coefficients of  these  variables  have a positive  sign,  then  the national government invests
more  based  on  productivity  efficiency  criteria.    We  assume  that  both  the  national  and  the
prefectural  government’s  behavior  is  based  on  the  efficiency  reason  in  private  productivity.
Therefore, g2 >0 (i.e. for ln(Yit/Lit))and d2 >0 (i.e. for ln(Yit/Lit))hold.
Hypothesis  3:  The  government’s  public  capital  investment  is  made  to  solve  the  regional
imbalance of stock of public capital.
As we explained previously, the government’s investment behavior is also affected
by the stock level of public capital.    If the national government invests more public capital in
order to reduce regional inequalities, then the prefectures with less public capital would receive
more  public  investment.    Because  in  general  the  government  considers  both  efficiency  and
equity  criteria,  we  assume  that  the  government  behaves  based  on  the  equity  reason  in  this
measure.    Therefore, in this case, the relationship between the government’s investment of the
both the national and the prefectural government and stock of public capital could be negative.
Therefore, g1 <0 (i.e. for ln(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1))and d1 <0 (i.e. for ln(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1))11
Hypothesis 4: Public capital investment is complementary between national and prefectural
governments.
As  for  the  intergovernmental  relationship  in  investment  behavior,  there  are  three
possibilities: complementary, substitutive and neutral.    Although this is an empirical question,
we  assume  that  the coefficient of  this variable could be  positive, because  in many cases the
public  investment  is  made  cooperatively  by  the  national  government  and  prefectural
government.    Therefore, g3 >0 (i.e. for lnIg
P
it ) and g3 >0 (i.e. for lnIg
P
it ).  
Hypothesis 5: Public capital investment is promoted by lobbying activities.
As for the lobbying factor, because more investment in public capital increases total
revenues  and  job  opportunities  for  the  industries  related  to  public  capital,  industries  have
incentives  to  promote  lobbying.    The  percentage  of  the  primary  industry  in  number  of
employees  and  the  percentage  of  the  construction  industry  in  number  of  employees  can  be
considered as related to this factor.    Therefore,  g4 >0 (i.e. for lnRAGit), g5 >0 (i.e. for lnRCNit)
and  d4 >0 (i.e. for lnRAGit), d5 >0 (i.e. for lnRCNit).
Hypothesis  6:  Public  capital  investment  is  promoted  if  the  majority-minority  difference
becomes smaller in a political election.
As  explained  above,  politicians  could  use  their  influence  to  affect  the  degree  of
public  capital  investment.    Among  several  factors  in  politics,  one  interesting  question  is
whether  or  not  political  stability  tends  to  have  a  positive  relationship  with  public  capital
investment.    In  order to test  this factor,  we  include  in the national government’s investment
function the ratio of majority vote to minority vote in the House of Representatives.    Therefore,
g6 >0 (i.e. for lnRLSit).
On the other hand, in the case of the prefectural government’s investment function,
the percentage of vote for the Liberal Democratic Party in prefectural congress is assumed to be
positive.    Therefore, d6 >0 (i.e. for lnPLDit ).  
Hypothesis 7:  The  public capital  investment of  the prefectural  government is halted  if  the
prefectural government’s tax revenues are tight.
Most prefectural  governments  in  Japan  have  been facing  financial  difficulties.    In
many cases, prefectural expenditures exceed tax revenues.    In order to test how a prefectural
government’s public capital investment would be affected by the fiscal situation, we assume that12
prefectural government’s budget constraints have an effect on public capital investment.    If the
stand-alone revenues become large, then the government invests more.    Therefore, there is a
positive  relationship  between  public  investment  and  the  revenues-expenditures  ratio  in
prefectural budget.    Therefore,   d8 >0 (i.e. for lnBALit).
Hypothesis  8: The  public  capital  investment of  the  prefectural  government is  promoted  by
grants from the national government.
Similar  to  the  case  for  hypothesis  7,  the  more  government  grants  a  prefectural
government has for the construction of infrastructure, the more investment there will be by the
prefectural government.    Therefore,  d7 >0 (i.e. for lnNTGit  ).
4.2 Data
We use a panel data set of 46 prefectures for 5 time periods (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995). Although there are 47 prefectures in Japan, we use 46 prefectures, excluding Okinawa
because  it  is  located  about  700km  southeast  of  Kyushu,  one  of  Japan’s  main  islands.
Furthermore, as Okinawa remained under U.S. occupation until May of 1972 and many U.S.
military  bases  are  located  there,  we  would  have  been  required  to  consider  many  unusual
political  factors.    Therefore, we exclude  Okinawa  prefecture in this study.    As a result, the
total sample size used here is 230 observations.
4.3 Variables
All variables used in this study are based on prefectures in Japan and they are defined
as follows.    The statistical information for the variables is summarized in Table 2.    First, the
output of private sector (Yit) is the gross prefecture products of the private sector, obtained from
the  item  “industry”  in  the  statistical  data  sources,  Annual  Report  on  Prefectural  Accounts
(Kenmin Keizai Keisan Nenpo) and Report on Prefectural Accounts from 1955 to 1974 (Chouki
Sokyu Suikei Kenmin Keizai Keisan Hokoku) issued by the Economic Planning Agency.  
Labor input (Lit) defined here is total working hours, calculated by multiplying the
number of total employees in the private sector and the total annual working hours per person.  
Private capital (Kit) is defined as the sum of the capital stock of ten private industries:
(1)agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing,  (2)mining,  (3)construction,  (4)manufacturing,  (5)public
utilities (electric power, gas, water supply and heat supply, (6)transport and telecommunications,
(7)wholesale  and  retail,  (8)banking  and  insurance,  (9)real  estate,  and  (10)  service  industry.13
However, these data are available only for the years 1953 to 1963, compelling us to estimate the
capital stock of the private sector based on limited available data.    Generally, the estimation of
each prefecture’s capital stock is allocated from the national capital stock of the private sector
according to the weight of the prefecture.    The weight of the prefecture is obtained according
to the amount of investment.




Yit Million yen 7,210,133 10,542,663 899,232 86,741390
Lit Ten thousands man-hours 281,468 289,280 67,853 1,889,678
Kit Million yen 11,374,169 15,594,515 828,060 141,558,711
Git Million yen 3,099,763 2,966,615 460,516 28,809,711
Gi,t-1 Million yen 2,231,690 2,225,680 282,190 22,106,394
POPi,t-1 person 2,473,132 2,210,007 581,694 11,639,293
Ig
C
it Million yen 182,803 213,536 23,963 1,636,055
Ig
P
it, Million yen 280,228 203,102 44,106 1,697,881
RAGit % 13.54 7.45 0.37 34.79
RCNit % 9.71 1.27 6.90 13.38
RLSit, - 1.19 0.63 0.26 3.75
PLDit % 48.96 9.58 25.40 70.30
NTGit Million yen 322,967 197,371 99,994 1,526,205
BALi, t-1 - 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.78
Public capital (Git) used here is the sum of the public capital stock of four industries:
(1)roads,  (2)ports  and  airports,  (3)agriculture  (e.g. agriculture,  forestry  and  fishing  facilities),
(4)land security (e.g. dams and banks).    Most data is obtained from the Infrastructure of Japan
(Nihon  no  Shakai  Shihon)  by  the  Economic  Planning  Agency,  and  Annual  Statistics  of
Construction  of  Public  Works  (Kokyo  Koji  Chakko  Tokei  Nendoho)  by  the  Ministry  of
Construction.    Public capital in the previous time period (Gi,t-1) is the same as above.
Investment  of  the  national  government  (Ig
C
it)  and  investment  of  the  prefectural
government (Ig
P
it,) are the total amount of investment in four categories: (1) roads, (2) ports and
airports,  (3)  agriculture,  fishing  and  forestry,  (4)  land  security.    The  figures  for  these
investments are reported by distinguishing national government and prefectural government in14
the Ministry of Construction’s The Annual Statistical Report on the Public Works Construction
Started (Kokyo Koji Chakko Tokei Nendoho).
 As for lobbying, because there are no data on how often lobbying activities have
been carried out, we use two kinds of variables as proxy variables: the percentage of employees
in the first industry (RAGit) and the percentage of employees in the construction industry (RCNit).
The first industry consists of agriculture, fishing and forestry.    Public capital as defined in our
study is related to the infrastructure of these industries.    Therefore, if the percentage of these
industries becomes higher, we assume that pressure on policymakers becomes stronger to build
more infrastructure.    These variables are defined as the number of employees in each industry
divided by the total number of employees in all industries.
As for the political factor, two variables are used: (1) the ratio of majority vote to
minority vote in the House of Representatives (RLSit,) and (2) the percentage of votes for the
leading party (Liberal Democratic Party) in the prefectural congress (PLDit).    First, the ratio of
majority vote to minority vote is used for the investment of the national government.    A ratio
of significantly more than one indicates a stable political  situation.    As the  ratio approaches
one, the political situation becomes unstable.    For example, in the case of political stability in
which  the  majority(minority)  vote  is  70%(30%),  then  the  ratio  is about  2.33.    On  the  other
hand, in an unstable political situation in which the majority (Minority) vote is 50.1%(49.9%),
the  ratio  becomes  about  1.00.    Thus,  this  variable  represents  political  stability.    The
percentage of votes for the leading party in the prefectural congress is used for the investment of
the  prefectural  government.    In  general,  in  many  cases,  especially  prefectures  with  large
metropolitan areas, the Liberal Democratic Party is the majority but in prefectures without large
metropolitan areas it is not.    Furthermore, in the prefectural congress, we can see many cases
where the minority party  in the House of Representatives joins the majority.    However,  it is
often  observed  that  the  leading  party  in  the  House  has  had  a  strong  political  influence  on
investment  decisions by prefectural governments.    Therefore, we  define this variable for  the
investment of the prefectural government.
Finally, as for the fiscal factor, two variables such as national government grants for
the  construction  of  infrastructure  (NTGit)  and  the  stand-alone  revenues-expenditures  ratio  of
prefectural budget (BALit-1) are defined here.    First, the figures on national grants to prefectural
governments  are  obtained  from  the  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs’  Annual  Statistics  on  Local
Government  Finance  (Chiho  Zaisei  Tokei  Nenpo).    The  stand-alone  revenues-expenditures
ratio of a prefectural budget is how much of its own revenue the prefectural government has.15
Most prefectural governments, except for large prefectures such as Tokyo, have been getting a
significant amount of money, such as the distribution of local allocation tax from the national
government.    Prefectural officials sometimes claim that their own revenues, such as local tax
and user  charges, comprise only  30%  of  total  revenues.    In  this study,  as  we  would  like  to
know the effect of prefectural budget constraints on the investment of public capital, we define
the  stand-alone  revenues-expenditures  ratio  by  dividing  total  prefecture  revenues  less  the
distribution  of  local  allocation  tax  (i.e.  local  tax  revenues  and  user  charges)  by  the  total
expenditures of the prefectural budgets.
4.3 Results
Selected  estimation  results  are  summarized  in Table  3.    Although  most  cases  are
estimation results of the 3SLS for the four simultaneous equations, we also present the result of
the fixed effect model by the estimation of equation-by-equation.    Overall results seem to be
reasonable: the fit of  the four equations  is pretty high with R
2 ranging  from 0.664  to 0.999.
From the estimation results, the following conclusions can be drawn.
First, the coefficient of public capital stock (Git) in the production function is stable
with  respect  to  the  different  specifications,  even  if  the  estimate  for  the  coefficient  of  public
capital  does  not  vary  much  between  single  equation  and  simultaneous  equation.    The
coefficient  of  public  capital  in  the  production  function  is  about  0.05  to  0.06  with  statistical
significance.    Therefore,  Hypothesis  1,  which  predicts  that  public  capital  contributes  to
productivity, holds.    However, the value of the coefficient seems a bit smaller than that of the
equivalent  public  capital  in  the  previous  studies.    For  example,  the  coefficients  of  public
capital in the previous studies are 0.240(core-infrastructure) in Aschauer(1989), 0.060(highway)
in  Munnell(1990),  0.044-0.045(highway)  in  Garcia-Mila  and  McGuire(1992),  0.172  (core-
infrastructure) in Mitsui et al.(1995), 0.152-0.347 (industry) in Ida and Yoshida(1999).




it)  and  private
productivity(Yit/Lit), the results are different between the central government and the prefectural
government.    The coefficient of private productivity in the public investment function of the
national  government  is  about  0.76  to  1.14.    On  the  other  hand,  the  coefficient  of  private
productivity in the public investment function of the prefectural government shows the negative
sign: about –0.854 to –0.965 in the simultaneous model.    These results show that the national
government  invests more  based  on the  efficiency  reason  but  that  the prefectural  government
invests more based on the equity reason.16




it)  and  public  capital  per
capita(Gi,t-1/POPi,t-1) is the opposite of results regarding private productivity.    The coefficient of
public  capital  per  capita  in  the  national  government’s  public  investment  function  shows  the
negative  sign,  which  varies  about  –0.367  to –0.528.    On  the other  hand,  in the  case  of  the
prefectural government’s investment function, the public capital per capita shows the positive
sign, ranging  from about 0.282  to 0.392.    Compared with a variable which shows economic
flow  (i.e. private  productivity), the  contribution  of  public  capital  to public  investment  is  not
large.    As for this variable, the national government invests more based on the equity reason
but the prefectural government invests more based on the efficiency reason.





national  and  the  prefectural  government  could  hold  because  the  coefficients  of  public
investment  of  both  the  national  and  the  prefectural  government  show  the  positive  sign.
However, the degree of the effects varies: the prefectural government’s investment effect on the
national government’s investment  is much larger.    This result coordinates with the reality of
public  investment  because  the  national  government’s  big  projects  often  coordinate  with  the
local government’s.
As for the lobbying factor, we were unable to get consistent results.    In the national
government’s public investment function, the coefficient of the percentage of employees in the
construction industry (RCNit) shows the positive  sign but the percentage of employees  in the
first  industry(RAGit)  shows  negative.    On  the  other  hand,  in  the  prefectural  government’s
public investment function, only the percentage of employees in the first industry is significant
but the effect of that variable is not large.    These results show that the lobbying factor might be
effective in stimulating public investment by the national government.
As  for  the  political  factor,  first  the  ratio of  majority  vote  to  minority  vote  in  the
House of Representatives does not show a clear effect on the national government’s investment
function. According to the results of simultaneous equations, this factor is not significant.    On
the other hand, in the case of the prefectural government’s investment function, the percentage
of  votes  for  the  Liberal  Democratic  Party  in  prefectural  congress  shows  the  positive  sign,
varying from 0.166 to 0.181.
Finally, as for  the relationship  between public  capital investment  and the financial
difficulties, according to the regression results the revenues-expenditures ratio shows a positive
relationship,  varying  from  0.172  to  0.467.    And  the  availability  of  the  national  government
grants  for  the  construction  of  infrastructure  further  boosts  the  prefectural  government’s17
investment.
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2 ɹ 0.701 0.696 0.679 0.664 0.677





















































































2 ɹ 0.906 0.885 0.840 0.743 0.80518
5. Concluding Remarks
The main goals of our study is to clarify two important issues: whether or not public
infrastructure  contributes  to  production  in  the  private  sector,  and  whether  or  not  political
economy factors  such  as  political  situations, lobbying factors  and  the availability  of  national
grants for investment affect the allocation of public infrastructure investment.    If the political
economy factors indeed affect allocation of public capital investment, what kinds of factors are
the  most  deterministic?    In  order  to  investigate  these  questions,  we  estimate  simultaneous
equations and evaluate them.    We obtain the following empirical results.
(1) The coefficient of public capital stock (Gi,t) in the production function is stable with respect
to  the  different  specifications.    Therefore,  the  hypothesis  that  public  capital  contributes  to
productivity, could hold.  




it) and private productivity(Yit/Lit),
the  results  are  different  between  the  national  government  and  the  prefectural  government.
Empirical results show that the national government might invest more based on the efficiency
reason but the prefectural government might invest more based on the equity reason.




it)  and  public  capital  per  capita(Gi,t-
1/POPi,t-1) is the opposite to the case of private productivity.    The national government invests
more  based  on  the  equity  reason  but  the  prefectural  government  invests  more  based  on  the
efficiency reason.




it) between the national and the
prefectural  government  could  hold.    However,  the  degree  of  the  effects  is  different:  the
prefectural  government’s  investment  effect  on  the  national  government’s investment  is  much
larger.
(5) As for the lobbying factor, we could not get consistent results.    Empirical results show that
the  lobbying  factor  regarding  the  construction  industry  might  be  effective  in  stimulating
investment by the national government.
(6)  We  cannot  find  a  clear  political  factor  in  the  national  government’s  public  investment
function but in the case of the prefectural government’s investment function, the factor has a
positive effect on investment.
(7) The availability of national government grants for the construction of infrastructure further
boosts investments by prefectural governments.  19
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